The strategic use of fuzziness in patent specifications
Alexandra Zaby () and
No 13-043, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Innovators seek to protect their intellectual assets by patenting them, at the same time trying to avoid any disclosure of critical knowledge. Given that a patent specification has to include a clear description of the patented matter so that anybody skilled in the art is enabled to reproduce the invention, the non-disclosure intention seems contradictory to patent law. This paper provides a model identifying the incentives for firms to deliberately obscure their inventive knowledge in a patent specification.
Keywords: patent specification; disclosure requirement; strategic firm behavior; fuzzy patents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 L24 D21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13043
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