Revenue autonomy preference in German state parliaments

Friedrich Heinemann, Eckhard Janeba, Marc-Daniel Moessinger () and Christoph Schröder

No 13-090, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform preferences of members of state parliaments. The study makes use of a self-conducted survey among the members of all 16 German state parliaments. It tests to which extent the preferences of these veto players for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states' self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results are helpful to understand the political-economic constraints of federal reforms. They indicate that besides the individual ideological position higher state wealth and lower debt levels are linked to larger reform support. Therefore, a promising new reform would have to address budgetary legacies like high pre-existing debt.

Keywords: fiscal equalization; tax competition; fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H63 H74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cdm and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Revenue Autonomy Preference in German State Parliaments (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13090

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