Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program

Cung Truong Hoang, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

No 14-043, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We empirically investigate the determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program. Applying a data set consisting of 442 firm groups that participated in 76 cartels decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011, we find that the probability of a firm becoming the chief witness increases with its character as repeat offender, the size of the expected basic fine, the number of countries active in one group as well as the size of the firm's share in the cartelized market. Our results have important implications for an effective prosecution of anti-cartel law infringers.

Keywords: Competition policy; cartels; leniency; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-eur, nep-hme, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14043

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