Registered cartels in Austria: An overview

Nikolaus Fink, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Konrad Stahl and Christine Zulehner

No 14-058, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country's EU Accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustaining collusion.

Keywords: Collusion; Cartels; Legal Cartels; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L41 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Registered cartels in Austria: an overview (2017)
Working Paper: Registered Cartels in Austria. An Overview (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14058

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