Efficiency, Compensation, and Discrimination: What is at Stake When Implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme?

Christoph Böhringer and Andreas Lange

No 03-73, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme covering major CO2 producing sites shall come into power. The key objective of the trading scheme is to promote cost-efficiency of carbon reduction within the EU. We identify policy-relevant tradeoffs between overall efficiency, compensation and competitive neutrality which arise in the concrete implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme through National Allocation Plans.

Keywords: emissions trading; allowance allocation; competition; National Allocation Plans; computable general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D58 H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1683

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