Non-compliance with temporary agency work regulations: Initial evidence from Germany

Angelika Ganserer

No 21-057, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Temporary agency work and outsourcing to a service contractor are two forms of alternative work arrangements with rather complex legal aspects which firms use for external staffing. The regulatory complexity of temporary agency work can lead to intended or unintended non-compliance when firms outsource to a service contractor. In this paper, I provide first evidence for non-compliance with temporary agency work regulations when firms contract out on the basis of a unique new firm survey. By exploiting a choice experiment, I demonstrate that firms do understand the regulatory baseline of temporary agency work, although detailed knowledge often seems to be missing. Non-compliance with regulations therefore often results from ignorance of the legal grayzone.

Keywords: temporary agency work; contracting out; compliance; choice experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J83 K31 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-isf, nep-lab and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21057

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