When Goliath shares with David: The effects of asymmetry on collaboration

Bernhard Ganglmair () and Alex Holcomb

No 26-030, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: Partners in R&D alliances and joint ventures are rarely symmetric, yet whether asymmetry helps or hurts collaboration is not fully understood. We study how asymmetry in competitors' information endowments affects collaborative knowledge exchange. A model of word-of-mouth communication predicts a clean separation: Initiating the knowledge exchange requires that the informational advantage sac rificed be sufficiently small, while the continuation incentive is independent of the initial endowment (and asymmetry). In a laboratory experiment, we confirm the model's comparative-statics predictions and establish three results. First, initiation rates decline as initial asymmetry increases, holding the better-endowed partner's initial endowment constant. Second, conditional on initiation, the initial asymme try does not predict defection later in collaboration. Third, extreme asymmetry reduces match length and joint surplus because initiation fails, not because continu ation breaks down. The initiation-continuation separation implies that governance mechanisms targeting the formation margin (such as pilot projects, phased disclo sure agreements, or credible commitments to reciprocate) can expand the range of asymmetric partnerships that succeed, while continuation requires no special intervention.

Keywords: asymmetric partnerships; cooperation; experimental economics; information sharing; joint ventures; knowledge diffusion; open innovation; R&D collaboration; strategic alliances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D83 L24 M21 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:343045

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