Payout Policy and Owners? Interests: Evidence from German Savings Banks

Volker Kleff and Martin Weber

No 05-59, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: The savings banks? decision to distribute profits among their public owners is strongly regulated by law in order to guarantee their adequate funding via retained profits. However, the legal scope is reluctantly exhausted. In this study we examine the determinants of the savings banks? payout decision in more detail. We find that besides internal determinants also external factors regarding the savings bank?s public owner have strong explanatory power. The better the financial situation of the public owner, the less likely is the savings bank to distribute profits and to increase payouts, respectively.

Keywords: Savings Banks; Germany; Payout Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24155/1/dp0559.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:4542

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().