Tarifbindung und die ökonomische Rationalität von Lohnrigiditäten

Wolfgang Franz and Friedhelm Pfeiffer

No 01-01, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: This study provides empirical evidence for the economic rationality of wage rigidities. Theoretically wage rigidities can result from contracts, implicit contracts, from efficiency wages and from insider-outsider behaviour. Based on a survey of 801 firms strong support has been found for explanations based on collective wage agreements and on efficency wages as well. Collective wage agreements and implicit contracts are important reasons for wage rigidities for the low skilled. Furthermore survey respondents indicate that the reduction of turnover costs, adverse selection and specific human capital in quits are important reasons for wage rigidities for high skilled labour. Compared to findings from the USA, in Germany collective wage agreements and firm specific human capital seem to be more important explanations.

Keywords: Lohnrigiditäten; Arbeitsrecht; Tarifverträge; Effizienzlohntheorien; ?Insider-Outsider?-Theorien; Beschäftigung (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J41 J51 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24419/1/dp0101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5356

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().