Public Universities, Tuition and Competition: A Tiebout Model

Robert Schwager

No 07-056, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: A simple Tiebout model is presented where states provide university education to both immobile and mobile students. State governments choose the quality of public universities by trading off the value of education for the local immobile student population and the costs, net of tuition revenues, of running the university. The quality of education and the assignment of students to universities in an efficient allocation are characterised. It is shown that decentralised decisions result in efficient choices if states are allowed to choose tuition levels freely. If tuition is capped, ine?ciently low qualities are likely to arise.

Keywords: higher education; migration; fiscal externality; club good; tuition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H75 H77 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-mig, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:6653

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