Rankings games

Bruno Frey and Margit Osterloh

No 39, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the “taste for science” by a “taste for publication”. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.

Keywords: Academic governance; rankings; motivation; selection; socialization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 D02 H83 L23 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ranking Games (2015)
Working Paper: Ranking Games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:039

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