Ranking Games

Margit Osterloh and Bruno Frey

Evaluation Review, 2015, vol. 39, issue 1, 102-129

Abstract: Background: Research rankings based on bibliometrics today dominate governance in academia and determine careers in universities. Method: Analytical approach to capture the incentives by users of rankings and by suppliers of rankings, both on an individual and an aggregate level. Result: Rankings may produce unintended negative side effects. In particular, rankings substitute the “taste for science†by a “taste for publication.†We show that the usefulness of rankings rests on several important assumptions challenged by recent research. Conclusion: We suggest as alternatives careful socialization and selection of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. The aim is to encourage controversial discourses in order to contribute meaningful to the advancement of science.

Keywords: academic governance; rankings; motivation; selection; socialization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0193841X14524957 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Ranking Games (2011)
Working Paper: Rankings games (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:evarev:v:39:y:2015:i:1:p:102-129

DOI: 10.1177/0193841X14524957

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Evaluation Review
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().