Robust stochastic stability

Carlos Alós–Ferrer and Nick Netzer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carlos Alós-Ferrer

No 63, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

Keywords: Learning in games; stochastic stability; radius-coradius theorems; logit-response dynamics; mutations; imitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02, Revised 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Robust stochastic stability (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:063

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