Informational requirements of nudging

Jean-Michel Benkert and Nick Netzer

No 190, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: A nudge is a paternalistic government intervention that attempts to improve choices by changing the framing of a decision problem. We propose a welfare- theoretic foundation for nudging similar in spirit to the classical revealed preference approach, by investigating a model where preferences and mistakes of an agent can be elicited from her choices under different frames. We provide characterizations of the classes of behavioral models for which nudging is possible or impossible, and we derive results on the required quantity of information. We also study an extended application to a savings problem.

Keywords: Nudge; framing; behavioral welfare economics; revealed preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D04 D60 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04, Revised 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Informational Requirements of Nudging (2018)
Working Paper: Informational Requirements of Nudging (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:190

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