Informational Requirements of Nudging

Jean-Michel Benkert and Nick Netzer

No 5327, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A nudge is a non-coercive paternalistic intervention that attempts to improve choices by manipulating the framing of a decision problem. As any paternalism, it faces the difficulty of determining the appropriate welfare criterion. We propose a welfare-theoretic foundation for nudging similar in spirit to the classic revealed preference approach, by investigating a model where preferences and mistakes of an agent have to be elicited from her choices under different frames. We provide characterizations of the classes of behavioral models for which nudging is possible or impossible. For the case where nudging is possible in principle, we derive results on the required quantity of information.

Keywords: nudge; framing; behavioral welfare economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D04 D60 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Informational Requirements of Nudging (2018)
Working Paper: Informational requirements of nudging (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5327

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