Moral Property Rights in Bargaining
Simon Gï¿½chter and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter ()
No 113, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a ï¿½moral property rightï¿½ that is influential independent of negotiatorsï¿½ legal property rights.
Keywords: Moral property rights; fairness judgments; bargaining with claims; selfserving bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D63 C78 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Moral property rights in bargaining (2017)
Working Paper: Moral Property Rights in Bargaining (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:113
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