Knight Fever towards an Economics of Awards

Bruno Frey

No 239, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual�s desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives.

Keywords: Incentives; motivation; awards; orders; distinction; principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D73 J22 J33 L22 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Knight Fever – Towards an Economics of Awards (2005)
Working Paper: Knight Fever: Towards an Economics of Awards (2005)
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