Knight Fever – Towards an Economics of Awards

Bruno Frey

No 1468, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual’s desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives

Keywords: incentives; motivation; awards; orders; distinction; principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Working Paper: Knight Fever: Towards an Economics of Awards (2005)
Working Paper: Knight Fever towards an Economics of Awards
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