Central Bank Design with Heterogeneous Agents

Aleksander Berentsen and Carlo Strub ()

No 365, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.

Keywords: Policy board; monetary policy; search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E4 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Central bank design with heterogeneous agents (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:365

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