Central bank design with heterogeneous agents

Aleksander Berentsen and Carlo Strub ()

European Economic Review, 2009, vol. 53, issue 2, 139-152

Abstract: We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.

Keywords: Central; bank; design; Monetary; policy; Majority; voting; Policy; board (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Central Bank Design with Heterogeneous Agents (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:139-152

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