EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Details about Dominique Demougin

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/organisation/
Phone:(49)30-2093-1592
Postal address:Humboldt University at Berlin Spandauer Str. 1 10178 Berlin Germany
Workplace:Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE) (Interuniversity Center on Risk, Economic Policy and Employment), (more information at EDIRC)
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät (Faculty of Economics), Humboldt-Universität, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Dominique Demougin.

Last updated 2009-08-29. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pde25


Jump to Journal Articles Editor

Working Papers

2009

  1. Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich Downloads View citations
  2. Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich Downloads View citations
    Also in Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology) (2008) Downloads

2007

  1. Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich Downloads View citations
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2006) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2008)

2006

  1. Governance: Who Controls Matters
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads View citations
  2. Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads View citations
  3. Institutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads View citations
  4. Technological Choice under Organizational Diseconomies of Scale
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads View citations
  5. The Division of Ownership in New Ventures
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads View citations
    Also in Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim (2004) Downloads View citations

2005

  1. Do Factor Shares Reflect Technology?
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Macroeconomics (2008)

2004

  1. Autonomy of the University and the Professionalisation of its Organisation of Control
    Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim Downloads
  2. Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO Downloads View citations
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2004) Downloads
  3. Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE Downloads View citations
    Also in CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2004) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in Canadian Journal of Economics (2006)

2003

  1. Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO Downloads View citations
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2003) Downloads View citations
  2. Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in International Economic Review (2006)
  3. Inequity Aversion in Tournament
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO Downloads View citations
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2003) Downloads View citations

2002

  1. Preponderance of Evidence
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO Downloads View citations
    Also in Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal (2002) Downloads View citations
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2002) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in European Economic Review (2006)

2000

  1. Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal Downloads
    See also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (2003)
  2. Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal Downloads

1999

  1. Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal Downloads View citations
  2. Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA
    ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research Downloads
    See also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (2003)
  3. Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques Downloads

1998

  1. A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques
    See also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (1999)
  2. Public Safety, Altruism and Redistribution
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal Downloads View citations
  3. Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal Downloads View citations

1997

  1. Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal Downloads View citations

1996

  1. Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (1998)

1995

  1. Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
    Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques
  2. Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads
    Also in Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques (1992)
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (1993) Downloads
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (1992)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1994)

1992

  1. Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal
    Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (1991)

    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1994)
  2. Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms
    Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal

1991

  1. Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability
    Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1991)
  2. Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich

1989

  1. A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv

Journal Articles

2008

  1. Customary versus technological advancement tests
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2008, 28, (2), 106-112 Downloads View citations
  2. Do factor shares reflect technology?
    Journal of Macroeconomics, 2008, 30, (3), 1329-1334 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2005)
  3. Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2008, 24, (3), 615-627 Downloads
  4. Rules of proof, courts, and incentives
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (1), 20-40 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2007)
  5. The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 31-43 Downloads

2007

  1. Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007, 16, (1), 111-128 Downloads

2006

  1. INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
    International Economic Review, 2006, 47, (3), 1033-1055 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2003)
  2. Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
    German Economic Review, 2006, 7, 463-470 Downloads View citations
  3. Output and wages with inequality averse agents
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 2006, 39, (2), 399-413 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2004)
  4. Preponderance of evidence
    European Economic Review, 2006, 50, (4), 963-976 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2002)

2005

  1. Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, 161, (2), 193- View citations

2004

  1. Ärzte unterschiedlicher Sorgfaltswaltung, fehlerhafte Gerichte und der Fahrlässigkeitsstandard: Korreferat zum Beitrag von Anja Olbrich: „Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard“
    Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, 2004, 73, (4), 575-578

2003

  1. Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2003, 23, (2), 217-225 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)
  2. Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2003, 23, (3), 309-321 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2001

  1. Monitoring versus incentives
    European Economic Review, 2001, 45, (9), 1741-1764 Downloads View citations

2000

  1. Excess burden of criminality and redistribution
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2000, 20, (3), 329-351 Downloads View citations
  2. exposita notes: Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition
    Economic Theory, 2001, 17, (2), 489-496 Downloads

1999

  1. A further justification for the negligence rule
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1999, 19, (1), 33-45 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1998)

1998

  1. Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1998, 154, (4), 622- View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1996

  1. Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies
    European Economic Review, 1996, 40, (7), 1483-1499 Downloads

1994

  1. Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies
    American Economic Review, 1994, 84, (5), 1261-77 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1992)
  2. Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm
    Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 55, (2), 203-231 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)

1991

  1. Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (4), 477-489 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)
  2. Efficient Budget Balancing Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring
    Economic Theory, 1991, 1, (4), 373-83 View citations

1989

  1. A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1989, 20, (2), 256-267 Downloads View citations

Editor

  1. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
    Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
 
 
Page updated 2009-11-23