Details about Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

Access statistics for papers by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky.

Last updated 2008-09-01. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pla300

Working Papers

2007

1. Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant
   Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Comparative Economics (2007)
2. Non-classical expected utility theory with application to type indeterminacy
   PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)
3. Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
   PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)

2006

4. Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Natural Bankruptcy Experiment
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   Also in PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) (2006)
5. Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel - Favoritism in Procurement Auctions -
   PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)
   Also in Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) (2006)

2005

6. Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement
   PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2006)
7. Non-classical Measurement Theory: a Framework for Behavioral Sciences
   Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
   Also in PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) (2005)
8. Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats
   PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) View citations
   Also in Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics (2004)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Development Economics (2007)

2003

9. Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence
   Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) View citations
10. Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders
    Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) View citations
11. Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-man
    Discussion Paper Series, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem View citations

2000

12. Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Evidence from Russia
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
13. Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
    Also in DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) (2000) View citations

1998

14. Regulation by negotiation:on the role of private benefits
    THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
    Also in Working Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1998)

1997

15. Regulatory blackmail in procurement relationships
    CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange), CEPREMAP View citations

1995

16. Indirect Monitoring and Optimal Corruption
    Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics View citations

Journal Articles

2008

1. Measurable systems and behavioral sciences
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 55, (3), 315-340 View citations
2. Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach
   International Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 4, (2), 273-297 View citations

2007

3. Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant
   Journal of Comparative Economics, 2007, 35, (2), 254-277 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2007)
4. Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats
   Journal of Development Economics, 2007, 83, (2), 351-367 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2006

5. Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement
   Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006, 15, (4), 883-908 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2005

6. Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, 36, (1), 1-15 View citations

2002

7. Regulation by Negotiation: the Private Benefit Bias
   Topics in Theoretical Economics, 2002, 2, (1), 1042-1042
8. Why firms pay occasional bribes: the connection economy
   European Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 18, (1), 47-60

1998

9. On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts
   Review of Economic Design, 1998, 3, (4), 303-328 View citations