Details about Rudolf Müller

Access statistics for papers by Rudolf Müller.

Last updated 2009-11-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pml13

Working Papers

2009

1. Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
2. What affects lifelong learning of scientists and engineers?
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2008

3. Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
   Also in Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (2007)
   Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2007)
   See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2009)
4. Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2007

5. Combinatorial Scoring Auctions
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
6. Matrix bids in combinatorial auctions: expressiveness and micro-economic properties
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
7. On The Fastest Vickrey Algorithm
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2006

8. Decentralization and Mechanism Design for Online Machine Scheduling
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
9. Games and Mechanism Design in Machine Scheduling – An Introduction
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
10. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
11. The family of c-bisection auctions: efficiency and running time
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations

2005

12. Mechanisms for Decentralized Online Scheduling
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
13. Weak Monotonicity and Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatibility
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2007)

2004

14. Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
    Also in Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (2004) View citations
15. The communication complexity of private value single item auctions
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2002

16. The private value single item bisection auction
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2007)
17. Web Service Retrieval by Structured Models
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2001

18. Auctions - the Big Winner Among Trading Mechanisms for the Internet Economy
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology
19. Design and Evaluation of an Economic Experiment via the Internet
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology View citations
    Also in Working Papers, Humboldt University, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2001)
20. Retrieval of Service Descriptions using Structured Service Models
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology

Undated

21. A Framework for Micropayment Evaluation
    Working Papers, Humboldt University, Sonderforschungsbereich 373
    See also Journal Article in Netnomics (1999)
22. Achieving Interoperability between the Distributed Model-Management-System MMM and Progress
    Working Papers, Humboldt University, Sonderforschungsbereich 373
23. From GISystems to GIServices: Spatial Computing on the Internet Marketplace
    Working Papers, Humboldt University, Sonderforschungsbereich 373 View citations
24. Integrated Scientific Computing in Global Network
    Working Papers, Humboldt University, Sonderforschungsbereich 373

Journal Articles

2009

1. Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
   Econometrica, 2009, 77, (1), 307-316
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2007

2. The private value single item bisection auction
   Economic Theory, 2007, 30, (1), 107-118 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2002)
3. Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 61, (2), 344-358 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2006

4. Mini special issue: Electronic Market Design
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 55, (2), 213-214

2001

5. Design and evaluation of an economic experiment via the Internet
   Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2001, 46, (2), 227-247 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2001)

1999

6. A framework for micropayment evaluation
   Netnomics, 1999, 1, (2), 187-200 View citations
   See also Working Paper