Details about Jennifer Reinganum

E-mail:
Homepage:	http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/reinganum
Phone:	615-322-2937
Postal address:	Department of Economics 415 Calhoun Hall Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37235
Workplace:	Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Jennifer Reinganum.

Last updated 2009-02-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

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Working Papers

2008

1. Privacy, Publicity, and Choice
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
2. Settlement
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University

2007

3. Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
4. Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University

2006

5. Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
6. Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2008)

2005

7. Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
8. Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
   See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2008)

2004

9. Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
10. Secrecy and Safety
    Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society
    Also in American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association View citations
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University (2003)
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2005)

2003

11. Markets, Torts and Social Inefficiency
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2006)

2002

12. Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2004)
13. Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2004)

2001

14. Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Law and Economics Review (2003)

1994

15. Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court
    Game Theory and Information, EconWPA
    Also in Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics (1991)
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics (1994)
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1995)
16. Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics View citations
    Also in Game Theory and Information, EconWPA (1994) View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1995)
17. Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency
    Game Theory and Information, EconWPA View citations
    See also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (1994)

1991

18. Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1993)
19. On the Determination of Roles in Bargaining Models: Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information
    Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics

1990

20. Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1991)

1989

21. Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Comnpliance: A Strategic Analysis
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1986

22. Credibility and Law Enforcement
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
23. Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1988)

1985

24. Settlement and Litigation Under Alternative Legal Systems
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1984

25. A Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Auditors
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
26. An Equilibrium Model of Tax Compliance with a Bayesian Auditor and some 'Honest' Taxpayers
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
27. Sequential Equilibrium Detection and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Evasion
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1983

28. A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development With Endogenous Second Mover Advantages
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization (1985)
29. Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R and D
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
30. Research and Development with a Generalized Hazard Function
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
31. The Economics of Income Taxation: Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1982

32. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1983)

1981

33. Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Bell Journal of Economics (1983)
34. The Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations

1980

35. A Note on Rational Threats and Competitive Equilibrium
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

1978

36. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Political Economy (1979)

Undated

37. A Class of Differential Games Where the Closed-Loop and Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Coincide
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
38. A Dynamic Game of R & D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
39. Dynamic Games of Innovation
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1981)
40. Innovation and Industry Evolution
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1985)
41. Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in Bell Journal of Economics (1981)
42. Nash Equilibrium Search for the Best Alternative
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1983)
43. Oligopoly Extraction of a Nonrenewable Common Property Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
44. On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in Review of Economic Studies (1981)
45. Strategic Lobbying Behavior
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
46. Strategic Search Theory
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
    See also Journal Article in International Economic Review (1982)
47. The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1986)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer. Comment
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 24-26
2. Imperfect competition and quality signalling
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (1), 163-183
   See also Working Paper (2005)
3. Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 106-126
   See also Working Paper (2006)

2007

4. Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 58, (1), 94-120 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2006

5. Markets, Torts, and Social Inefficiency
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, (2), 300-323
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2005

6. Secrecy and Safety
   American Economic Review, 2005, 95, (4), 1074-1091 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2004

7. Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2004, 35, (3), 467-485 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2002)
8. Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade
   Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2004, 13, (1), 125-150 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2002)

2003

9. Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases
   American Law and Economics Review, 2003, 5, (1), 134-164
   See also Working Paper (2001)

2002

10. Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2002, 33, (4), 587-604 View citations

2000

11. Appealing Judgments
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31, (3), 502-526 View citations
12. On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2000, 16, (2), 365-94 View citations
13. Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bargaining
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31, (1), 62-81 View citations

1999

14. Hush Money
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30, (4), 661-678 View citations
15. Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts
    American Law and Economics Review, 1999, 1, (1-2), 158-89 View citations

1998

16. A Note on Multiple Equilibria and Punitive Damages Rules in "Everybody Out of the Pool."
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1998, 14, (2), 379-87

1997

17. Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1997, 13, (2), 410-32 View citations

1995

18. Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, 26, (2), 203-221 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1994)
19. Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling
    American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (5), 1187-1206 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1994)

1994

20. Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game
    International Economic Review, 1994, 35, (4), 795-819 View citations
21. Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1994, 14, (3), 283-298 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1994)

1993

22. Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1993, 9, (2), 314-48 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1992

23. Search Equilibrium with Endogenous Recall
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1992, 23, (2), 184-202 View citations

1991

24. Endogenous Availability in Search Equilibrium
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (2), 287-306 View citations
25. Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1991, 7, (1), 163-81 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1990)

1988

26. A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988, 103, (4), 793-98 View citations
27. Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
    American Economic Review, 1988, 78, (4), 713-28 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1986)

1986

28. Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance
    International Economic Review, 1986, 27, (3), 739-60 View citations
29. Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, 17, (4), 557-566 View citations
30. The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1986, 2, (1), 1-32 View citations
    See also Working Paper

1985

31. A two-stage model of research and development with endogenous second-mover advantages
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1985, 3, (3), 275-292 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1983)
32. Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
    Journal of Public Economics, 1985, 26, (1), 1-18 View citations
33. Innovation and Industry Evolution
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985, 100, (1), 81-99 View citations
    See also Working Paper
34. Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
    International Economic Review, 1985, 26, (1), 161-73 View citations

1984

35. Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R&D
    American Economic Review, 1984, 74, (2), 61-66 View citations
36. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Reply
    American Economic Review, 1984, 74, (1), 243-46 View citations

1983

37. Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 30, (1), 139-152
    See also Working Paper
38. Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information
    Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, 14, (1), 57-69 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1981)
39. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly
    American Economic Review, 1983, 73, (4), 741-48 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1982)

1982

40. A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
    Econometrica, 1982, 50, (3), 671-88 View citations
41. Strategic Search Theory
    International Economic Review, 1982, 23, (1), 1-17
    See also Working Paper

1981

42. Dynamic games of innovation
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, 25, (1), 21-41 View citations
    See also Working Paper
43. Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology
    Bell Journal of Economics, 1981, 12, (2), 618-624 View citations
    See also Working Paper
44. On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach
    Review of Economic Studies, 1981, 48, (3), 395-405 View citations
    See also Working Paper

1979

45. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion
    Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 87, (4), 851-58 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1978)

Chapters

1989

1. The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion
   Chapter 14 in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1989, vol. 1, pp 849-908 View citations