Costly Persuasion

Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 5, 457-62

Abstract: We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.457
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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