Competitive Framing

Ran Spiegler ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 3, 35-58

Abstract: I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is "frame-dependent", and firms use costless "marketing messages" to influence the consumer's frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the "behavioral industrial organization" literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property. I use this result to analyze the equilibrium interplay between competition and framing in a variety of applications.

JEL-codes: D43 D82 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.35
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.6.3.35 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/ds/0603/2012-0207_ds.zip (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive Framing (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:35-58

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().