Majority Rules and Coalition Stability

Sergio Currarini () and Marco Marini

No 2012-01, DIAG Technical Reports from Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"

Abstract: We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.

Keywords: Majority Rule; Supermajority; Externalities; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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