Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?

Ali Ozkes and Remzi Sanver

No 1643, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alternatives. We show that given two qualified majority rules, if transitivity is desired for the societal outcome and if the thresholds of one of these rules are at least as high as the other's for any pair of alternatives, then at each preference profile the rule with higher thresholds results in a coarser social ranking. Hence all absolute qualified majority rules can be expressed as specific coarsenings of the simple majority rule.

Keywords: simple majority rule; qualified majority rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter? (2017)
Working Paper: Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter? (2017)
Working Paper: Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1643

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