Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric

Vassiliki Manoussi and Anastasios Xepapadeas

No 1511, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business

Abstract: We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous countries or group of countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a tradeoff actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.

Keywords: Climate change; mitigation; solar radiation management; cooperation; differential game; asymmetry; feedback Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2014)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2014)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:1511

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