Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina Klaus ()
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Claus-Jochen Haake: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 399, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.

Keywords: Stability; Nash implementation; Matching with couples; (Maskin) monotonicity; Weakly responsive preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315850/2319845 First Version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (2010)
Working Paper: Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:399

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