 Do Broad-based Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing and Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?Joseph Blasi, Richard Freeman and Douglas Kruse British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2016, vol. 54, issue 1, 55-82 Abstract: This article analyses the linkages among group incentive methods of compensation (broad-based employee ownership, profit sharing and stock options), labour practices, worker assessments of workplace culture, turnover and firm performance in firms that applied to the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For in America’ competition from 2005 to 2007. Although employers with good labour practices self-select into the 100 Best Companies firms sample, which should bias the analysis against finding strong associations among modes of compensation, labour policies and outcomes, we find that employees in the firms that use group incentive pay more extensively participate more in decisions, have greater information sharing, trust supervisors more and report a more positive workplace culture than in other companies. The combination of group incentive pay with policies that empower employees and create a positive workplace culture reduces voluntary turnover and increases employee intent to stay and raises return on equity. Date: 2016 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:54:y:2016:i:1:p:55-82 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article British Journal of Industrial Relations is currently edited by Edmund Heery More articles in British Journal of Industrial Relations from London School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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