DOES DELEGATION INCREASE WORKER TRAINING?
Christos Bilanakos,
John Heywood,
John G. Sessions and
Nikolaos Theodoropoulos
Economic Inquiry, 2018, vol. 56, issue 2, 1089-1115
Abstract:
We model a principal‐firm offering training to its agent‐worker under two alternative organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker; and delegation, where the principal cannot overrule the worker's preferred investment project. We assume that training reduces the worker's effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects' payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit‐maximizing intensity of training. Empirical estimates from matched employer–employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed‐effect estimates and, critically, in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects. (JEL D21, D22, D23, M53, M54)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12515
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:2:p:1089-1115
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... s.aspx?ref=1465-7295
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Tim Salmon
More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery (contentdelivery@wiley.com).