MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

Alberto Alesina, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini

Economics and Politics, 1992, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-30

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic “political business cycles” in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre‐electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of “political monetary cycles,” that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of “political budget cycles,” or “loose” fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post‐electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre‐electoral “loose” monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.

Date: 1992
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (128)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00052.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies (1992)
Working Paper: Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies (1992)
Working Paper: Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies (1991)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:1-30

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().