 Negative Incentives and Regulatory Capture: Noncompliance with Price Ceilings on Essential Medicines in IndiaMirko H. Benischke and Ajay Bhaskarabhatla Journal of Management Studies, 2024, vol. 61, issue 2, 336-374 Abstract: Nonmarket scholars have paid limited attention to noncompliance as an alternative strategy to capture regulators; yet noncompliance is particularly consequential given its potentially significant negative externalities. We exploit rich data on price ceilings introduced in India in 2013 on 255 essential medicines to test whether noncompliance by other firms drives the focal firm's noncompliance decision. Our results indicate that noncompliance by other firms, particularly those with larger products in the market, is positively associated with a focal firm's noncompliance. The focal firm's scope and sales positively moderate this relationship. Overall, our study indicates that firms are more likely conclude that the potential benefits of regulatory capture using negative incentives outweigh the potential financial and social costs in the presence of a greater number of firms that are already noncompliant. As such, our study draws attention to negative incentives as an important yet largely overlooked nonmarket strategy. Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jomstd:v:61:y:2024:i:2:p:336-374 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Management Studies is currently edited by Timothy Clark, Steven W. Floyd and Mike Wright More articles in Journal of Management Studies from Wiley Blackwell |
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