Electoral Systems, Legislative Process, and Income Taxation

Yan Chen

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 2, issue 1, 71-100

Abstract: We characterize the equilibrium income tax schedules and the optimality conditions under two types of political institutions, a two‐party plurality system with a single district, and one with multiple districts where tax policies are determined through a legislature. It is shown that the exogenous social welfare functions in the optimal taxation literature can be endogenously determined by explicitly modeling the political institutions, which put different welfare weights on different subsets of the population. This paper also extends the Coughlin probabilistic voting model and the Baron–Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to a function space.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:1:p:71-100

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