Unemployment Insurance and the Timing of Layoffs and Recalls

Stepan Jurajda

LABOUR, 2003, vol. 17, issue 3, 383-389

Abstract: Abstract. This note provides the motivation to fill a gap in the empirical literature by showing that the optimal firm response to workers’ job search behaviour (Mortensen, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30: 505–517, 1977) is to lay off those workers with high unemployment insurance and recall workers as they approach expiry of their benefits.

Date: 2003
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