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Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

Céline Bonnet and Pierre Dubois

RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, vol. 41, issue 1, 139-164

Abstract: We present a model of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers with nonlinear pricing strategies. Using home‐scan data on bottled water produced by manufacturers and sold by retail chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for two‐part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Using price‐cost margins recovered from estimates of demand parameters, we select the best supply model by performing nonnested tests, and find that manufacturers use two‐part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We then perform counterfactual policy simulations that restrict the use of these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative scenarios.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (203)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00093.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenanc (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (2008) Downloads
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