Removal of Potential Competitors – A Blind Spot of Merger Policy?

Massimo Motta () and Martin Peitz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: In dynamic industries, firms often face new competitive threats. If firms are able to identify those threats early on, they may simply acquire potential competitors under the radar of competition authorities. Merger policy thus has to deal with two issues: (1) how to make sure that potentially problematic mergers are notified and investigated; and (2) how to assess the social costs and benefits of such mergers. The latter requires to take a stance regarding the standard and burden of proof. We argue for a reversal of burden of proof, at least if one of the merging firms is considered to be a “systemic firm”.

Keywords: Merger policy; potential competitor; notification; standard of proof; burden of proof; killer acquisition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-ind and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_208

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