Promises & Partnership

Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others’ expectations in order to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.

Keywords: Promises; partnership; guilt aversion; psychological game theory; beliefs; trust; lies; social preferences; behavioral economics; hidden action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-19
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (955)

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Working Paper: Promises & Partnership (2003)
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