One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime

Quoc-Anh Do, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and Anh N. Tran

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Keywords: Favoritism; patronage; authoritarian regime; political connection; hometown; infrastructure; distributive politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
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