Trump Ante Portas: Political Polarization Undermines Rule-Following Behavior

Christoph Feldhaus, Lukas Reinhardt and Matthias Sutter

No 11485, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In a democracy, it is essential that citizens accept rules and laws, regardless of which party is in power. We study why citizens in polarized societies resist rules implemented by political opponents. This may be due to the rules’ specific content, but also because of a general preference against being restricted by political opponents. We develop a method to measure the latter channel. In our experiment with almost 1,300 supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, we show that polarization undermines rule-following behaviour significantly, independent of the rules’ content. Subjects perceive the intentions behind (identical) rules as much more malevolent if they were imposed by a political opponent rather than a political ally.

Keywords: political polarization; social identity; outgroup; economic preferences; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D90 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Trump Ante Portas: Political Polarization Undermines Rule-Following Behavior (2024)
Working Paper: Trump ante Portas: Political Polarization Undermines Rule-Following Behavior (2024)
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