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Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System

Hans Pitlik, Friedrich Schneider (friedrich.schneider@jku.at) and Harald Strotmann (harald.strotmann@hs-pforzheim.de)

No 1426, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.

Keywords: legislative bargaining; overrepresentation; fiscal transfer system; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System (2005) Downloads
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