Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

Kiryl Khalmetski and Dirk Sliwka

No 6347, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.

Keywords: cost of lying; image concerns; cheating game; truth-telling; deception (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6347

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