Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments

Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama
Additional contact information
Yutaka Kayaba: University of Tokyo
Tomohisa Toyama: International Christian University

No CARF-F-433, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of subjects follow generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Contrary to the prediction of the equilibrium theory, subjects tend to retaliate more with high accuracy than with low accuracy. They tend to retaliate more than the equilibrium theory predicts with high accuracy, while they tend to retaliate less with low accuracy.

Pages: 80
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments (2020)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf433

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