Details about Hitoshi Matsushima

Access statistics for papers by Hitoshi Matsushima.

Last updated 2009-11-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pma67

Working Papers

2009

1. Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
2. Implementation and Mind Control
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

2008

3. Effects of Reputation in Bubbles and Crashes
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
4. Implementation and Social Influence
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

2007

5. Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
   See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
6. Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2008)
7. Role of Honesty in Full Implementation
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
   Also in CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (2006) View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2008)
8. Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

2006

9. Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents
   CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
10. Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations

2005

11. Large Market Design in Dominance
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
12. Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
    Also in CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo (2002) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2007)

2004

13. Large Auction Design in Dominance
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
14. Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
15. On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
    See also Journal Article in The Japanese Economic Review (2005)

2003

16. Implementation and Preference for Honesty
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
17. Multi-Group Incentives
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
18. Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2004)
19. Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations

2002

20. Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
21. Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
22. Honesty-Proof Implementation
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
23. Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
24. Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
25. Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations

2001

26. "New Progress in Repeated Games: Implicit Collusion with Private Monitaring" (in Japanese)
    CIRJE J-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
27. Stable Implementation
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
28. The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations

2000

29. Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
30. The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations

1999

31. Moral Decision and Information Aversion
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
32. The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

1998

33. Efficient Entrepreneurship
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
34. Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structures
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
35. Learning as the Dynamics of Emotions and Strength of Confidence
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
36. Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2001)
37. Towards a Theory of Subjective Games
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

1997

38. Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations
39. Private observation and Communication and Collusion
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
40. Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games
    CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo View citations

1991

41. Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information
    Working Papers, Stanford - Hoover Institution View citations
    Also in Working Papers, Stanford - Hoover Institution (1991) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (1992)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
   Economics Letters, 2008, 100, (1), 161-164
   See also Working Paper (2007)
2. Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 141, (1), 134-151
   See also Working Paper (2007)
3. Role of honesty in full implementation
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 139, (1), 353-359 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2007)

2007

4. Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 133, (1), 1-30 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2005

5. ON DETAIL-FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY
   The Japanese Economic Review, 2005, 56, (1), 41-54
   See also Working Paper (2004)

2004

6. Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
   Econometrica, 2004, 72, (3), 823-852 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2001

7. Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 98, (1), 158-178 View citations
   See also Working Paper (1998)

1998

8. Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
   Econometrica, 1998, 66, (3), 627-652 View citations

1994

9. Exact Implementation
   Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 64, (1), 1-19 View citations

1993

10. Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, 59, (1), 107-121 View citations

1992

11. A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]
    Econometrica, 1992, 60, (6), 1439-42
12. Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
    Econometrica, 1992, 60, (5), 993-1008 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1991

13. Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
    Economics Letters, 1991, 37, (4), 371-375 View citations
14. Efficiency in partnerships
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 55, (2), 296-322 View citations
15. Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 54, (1), 198-203 View citations
16. On the theory of repeated games with private information: Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication
    Economics Letters, 1991, 35, (3), 253-256 View citations
17. On the theory of repeated games with private information: Part II: revelation through communication
    Economics Letters, 1991, 35, (3), 257-261 View citations

1990

18. Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games: Two-principal case
    Economics Letters, 1990, 34, (4), 329-332
19. Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
    Economics Letters, 1990, 34, (2), 109-112 View citations
20. Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching
    Economics Letters, 1990, 34, (3), 245-248 View citations

1989

21. Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48, (2), 428-442 View citations

1988

22. A new approach to the implementation problem
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1988, 45, (1), 128-144 View citations