Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CIRJE-F-519, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified.

Date: 2007-09
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Journal Article: Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf519

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