 Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433)Yutaka Kayaba,
Hitoshi Matsushima and
Tomohisa Toyama
No CARF-F-466, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follow generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it. Pages: 69 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf466 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC. |
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