Endowment Effects in Contests

Curtis Price () and Roman Sheremeta

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We design an experiment to test if the manner in which subjects receive the endowment has any bearing on the amount of overbidding in contests. We find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning play important roles in explaining our findings.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; experiments; overbidding; endowment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/EndowmentEffectsInContests-Sheremeta.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endowment effects in contests (2011)
Working Paper: Endowment Effects in Contests (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:09-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().