Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Participative Decision Making

Brice Corgnet and Roberto Hernán-González
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Roberto Hernán-González: Economic Science Institute, Chapman University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roberto Hernán González

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We study the effect of participative decision making in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can consult the agent’s preferred option regarding the task to be undertaken in the final stage of the game. We show that consulting the agent was beneficial to principals as long as they followed the agent’s choice. Ignoring the agent’s choice was detrimental to the principal as it engendered negative emotions and low levels of transfers. Nevertheless, the majority of principals were reluctant to change their mind and adopt the agent’s proposal. Our results suggest that the ability to change one’s own mind is an important dimension of managerial success.

Keywords: organizational behavior; participative decision making; principal-agent model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D82 E2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-04

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