Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games

Timothy Cason, Anya Savikhin and Roman Sheremeta
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Anya Savikhin: Becker Friedman Institute for Economic Research, The University of Chicago
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anya Savikhin Samek

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, this positive, Pareto-improving spillover is present even when group composition changes across games, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not influence play in the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

Keywords: coordination; order-statistic games; experiments; cooperation; minimum game; median game; behavioral spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral spillovers in coordination games (2012)
Working Paper: Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2011)
Working Paper: Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-20

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